Dhipragya Dwivedi
MSc Environmental
Science, Global Open University, Nagaland
UGC NET Environmental
Science
Abstract
India’s ambition to become a developed nation—Viksit Bharat—by the
centenary of its independence in 2047 coincides with an unprecedentedly tight
global climate deadline. This paper argues that green growth is not merely an
environmental accessory to the Viksit Bharat vision but a constitutive pillar
of it: sustained, high-growth development is impossible on a degraded resource
base, and India’s climate commitments, including net-zero by 2070 and the
Panchamrit targets announced at COP26, must therefore be read as an industrial
and economic strategy rather than a compliance exercise (Government of India,
2022). Drawing on the trajectory of India’s environmental policy
architecture—from the National Solar Mission to the National Green Hydrogen
Mission and the Life Mission—the paper assesses whether existing instruments
can deliver an inclusive green transition by 2047.
The paper finds that India’s green economy could unlock a market value of
roughly USD 1 trillion and sustain over 40 million jobs by 2047 if investment,
innovation, and institutional capacity are scaled decisively (Council on
Energy, Environment and Water [CEEW], 2025). However, several fault lines
remain under-addressed: the dominance of coal in the electricity mix, the
concentration of green industries and finance, the absence of robust social
protection for displaced workers in fossil-fuel and agrarian livelihoods, and
weak environmental federalism and enforcement. The paper proposes a rethinking
of the roadmap along three axes—alignment of fiscal incentives with Net Zero
goals, institutionalisation of just-transition planning at the state level, and
a shift from reactive regulation toward anticipatory, technology-inclusive
policy design. It concludes that Viksit Bharat, if it is to be real and
enduring, must be a green, resilient, and equitable development model rather
than a delayed variant of carbon-intensive growth.
Keywords:
Green growth; Viksit Bharat 2047; net zero 2070; climate policy; Panchamrit;
just transition; environmental governance; renewable energy.
1. Introduction
In August 2047, India will mark one hundred years of independence. The
Government of India has framed this milestone as a national development
benchmark—Viksit Bharat—envisioning a prosperous, inclusive, and globally
influential nation (NITI Aayog, 2023). The scale of the ambition is
considerable: an economy expected to grow by manifold multiples, with rising
per-capita incomes, urbanisation, industrialisation, and infrastructure. Yet
the very material foundation on which this growth rests—air, water, soil,
forests, and a stable climate—is under severe stress. India is among the most
climate-vulnerable countries in the world, confronting intensifying heatwaves,
erratic monsoons, floods, and coastal risks (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change [IPCC], 2022).
The central contention of this paper is that the environmental question
has been, and remains, wrongly framed as a trade-off against development. When
posed as “growth versus environment,” the choice is false. Resource degradation
erodes the very productivity that growth depends on: polluted air lowers labour
productivity, environmental health burdens raise public expenditure, and
climate disruption threatens infrastructure and agriculture. Conversely, a
growth strategy that internalises ecological limits—what is conventionally
termed green growth—can generate employment, innovation, and export
competitiveness while protecting the resource base (World Bank, 2012). This
paper therefore treats green growth not as an option superseding the Viksit
Bharat agenda but as the only coherent route to it.
The analysis proceeds through several stages. Section 2 clarifies the
concept of green growth and situates it within the Viksit Bharat framework.
Section 3 traces the evolution of India’s environmental policy architecture.
Section 4 examines the principal pillars of the green transition, while Section
5 considers the financing challenge. Section 6 interrogates governance and the
imperative of a just transition. Section 7 identifies the principal challenges
that demand rethinking. Section 8 offers policy recommendations, and Section 9
concludes.
2. Green Growth and the
Viksit Bharat Framework
The term green growth denotes a development path that fosters economic
growth and development while ensuring that natural assets continue to provide
the resources and environmental services on which human well-being relies
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2011). It is
distinguished from environmental regulation conceived as restraint; rather, it
is a productivity paradigm in which efficiency, circularity, clean energy, and
ecological restoration become sources of value. For a nation like India, green
growth offers the double dividend of decoupling emissions growth from income
growth while creating new industrial capability.
The Viksit Bharat programme does not, on its face, promise
decarbonisation as a headline goal. Its stated outcomes—economic size,
per-capita income, human development, infrastructure, and global standing—are
primarily developmental. But the programme’s own planning documents, and the
constitutional and legislative commitments India has made to climate action,
bind the two agendas together. Through the Panchamrit—five nectar
elements—announced at COP26 in Glasgow, India committed to achieving 500 GW of
non-fossil fuel capacity, meeting 50 percent of its energy requirements from
renewables, reducing one billion tonnes of projected emissions, cutting the
emissions intensity of GDP by 45 percent from 2005 levels, and reaching
net-zero emissions by 2070 (Government of India, 2022). Under the Paris
Agreement, India also submitted updated Nationally Determined Contributions
embedding these targets as binding elements of its climate architecture (United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 2022).
Read together, the developmental and climate agendas intersect. A Viksit
Bharat that achieves high income without energy security and climate resilience
would be brittle; a decarbonising India that forfeits growth and jobs would be
politically and socially unsustainable. The convergence of the two is what
green growth provides: a pathway in which clean technology, efficiency, and
ecological restoration generate the growth dividend while enabling India’s
Paris commitments (Climate Action Tracker, 2022).
3. The Evolution of
India’s Environmental Policy Architecture
India’s environmental policy has moved in distinct phases, each
reflecting shifting conceptions of the relationship between environment and
development. The earliest phase, rooted in the 1970s and 1980s, was regulatory
and pollution-focused, culminating in the Environment (Protection) Act of 1986,
which created an umbrella legal framework for environmental protection
(Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change [MoEFCC], 2019). During
this period the assumption was that industrialisation produced externalities
that the state must constrain.
The second phase, from the 1990s to the early 2000s, coincided with
economic liberalisation and the rise of global climate diplomacy. India’s
stance in international negotiations during this era was markedly
developmental—insisting on common but differentiated responsibilities and
resisting binding emissions reductions for developing economies. Domestically,
however, the seeds of a clean-energy strategy were planted, and the early 2000s
saw the emergence of dedicated environmental institutions and programmes.
The third phase, which this paper argues continues into the present, is
decisively green-growth oriented. The National Action Plan on Climate Change
(2008) and its missions, notably the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission,
signalled the shift from restraint to opportunity. The pace accelerated
markedly after the Paris Agreement: renewable capacity grew rapidly, the
International Solar Alliance was established, and in 2021–2022 the National
Green Hydrogen Mission and the Life Mission (lifestyle for environment) were
launched (Ministry of New and Renewable Energy [MNRE], 2023). The defining
feature of the contemporary phase is the framing of climate action as an
investment opportunity and strategic asset—an industrial policy for
competitiveness—rather than a cost to be borne.
This evolution is progressive, but it has not been linear or without
contradiction. Coal continues to dominate electricity generation, and the
transition has proceeded unevenly across sectors. The legacy of the regulatory
phase—segmented institutions, project-by-project environmental clearances, and
weak enforcement—still shapes implementation (Narain, 2021). The roadmap to
2047 must therefore confront both the unfinished business of the older
architecture and the new demands of a green economy.
4. Pillars of the Green
Transition to 2047
Four pillars define the substantive content of a green-growth roadmap to
2047.
Energy transition. The energy transition is the most advanced pillar.
India has positioned itself as a global renewable-energy leader, with ambitious
targets for solar, wind, and green hydrogen. The domestic renewable sector’s
rapid cost decline has made solar the cheapest new-build source in much of the
country. Yet the share of coal in generation remains high, and grid
integration, storage, and transmission are binding constraints. A credible 2047
pathway requires not only scaling renewables but a planned, socially managed
phase-down of fossil capacity led by a determinedly low-carbon electricity
system (Central Electricity Authority, 2023).
Industrial and resource efficiency. The second pillar is the
decarbonisation of industry, transport, and buildings. India’s industrial base
is heavily energy- and material-intensive, and demand for steel, cement, road
transport, and aviation is projected to surge with urbanisation and income
growth. Green growth in this sphere means efficiency, material substitution,
circularity, and green hydrogen as a feedstock for refining, fertiliser, and
steel. The National Green Hydrogen Mission exemplifies the attempt to build
whole new industries on clean-energy foundations (MNRE, 2023).
Nature and adaptation. The third pillar concerns ecosystems. Forests,
wetlands, and coastal systems are both carbon sinks and critical infrastructure
for adaptation to climate impacts. India’s large agrarian and coastal
populations depend on natural systems for livelihoods, and planetary resilience
is inseparable from rural prosperity. Investment in regenerative agriculture,
watershed management, forest restoration, and disaster risk reduction is
therefore a core, not peripheral, element of the green transition (IPCC, 2022).
Urban sustainability. The fourth pillar is the sustainable city.
Urbanisation is intrinsic to Viksit Bharat, yet Indian cities today suffer from
air pollution, inadequate water and sanitation, congestion, and heat exposure.
Green growth in the urban context means compact, transit-oriented,
energy-efficient, and climate-resilient urban development that simultaneously
lifts quality of life. This is where the health, equity, and productivity
dividends of green growth are most immediately realisable.
5. Financing the Green
Transition
The financing gap is the single most consequential obstacle to the 2047
roadmap. Estimates of India’s climate investment needs range into the trillions
of dollars cumulatively, a vast multiple of current public and private outlays.
Analysis by the Council on Energy, Environment and Water suggests that a full
green-economy transformation by 2047 could unlock a market value of around USD
1 trillion (approximately INR 97.7 lakh crore) and sustain roughly 48 million
jobs—evidence that the transition is as much an economic opportunity as a cost
(CEEW, 2025).
Mobilising this capital requires three instruments in combination. First,
public finance must be repurposed: subsidy regimes that currently favour fossil
fuels and resource-intensive agriculture should be progressively redirected
toward clean energy, green industry, and ecosystem services, with attention to
fiscal sustainability and distribution. Second, private capital must be scaled
through green finance markets, blended finance, and climate-aligned banking and
insurance regulation, enabling domestic institutional investors to fund
domestic transition assets. Third, international climate finance and technology
transfer, long pledged under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement but repeatedly
under-delivered, must be leveraged as a complement rather than a substitute for
domestic resources (UNFCCC, 2022).
6. Governance,
Institutions and the Just Transition
Institutions determine whether policy translates into outcomes. India’s
environmental governance is marked by centralised regulation, fragmented
agencies, and weak coordination between the Centre, states, and municipalities.
Environmental federalism in India means that implementation depends heavily on
state capacity, which varies considerably. A roadmap to 2047 therefore depends
on building state-level green-planning capacity, harmonising environmental
clearances with developmental priorities, and strengthening monitoring,
accountability, and public participation (Narain, 2021).
Equally central is the just transition. The shift away from coal and
carbon-intensive agriculture will displace workers and communities whose
livelihoods are bound to those sectors. Coal-mining regions in particular face
the risk of abrupt economic decline if the transition is unmanaged. A just
transition requires anticipatory planning—skill development, alternative
livelihoods, diversification of coal-linked districts, and robust social
protection. Without it, the ecological case for green growth will founder on
the legitimate resistance of affected populations, and the political
sustainability of the entire agenda is jeopardised.
7. Challenges Demanding
Rethinking
Notwithstanding the strengths of India’s framework, several challenges
compel a fundamental rethinking of the roadmap. First, the incumbency of coal
entails entrenched economic and political interests, and a growth-first framing
can excuse indefinitely delayed phase-downs. The momentum of grid expansion,
financing, and storage must be deliberately engineered to outpace coal’s
inertia.
Second, the distributive dimension has been insufficiently integrated.
Green industries and finance have tended to concentrate in a handful of states
and firms, while energy transition costs and health externalities fall
unevenly. A genuine Viksit Bharat cannot leave entire regions as the losers of
decarbonisation.
Third, enforcement and data gaps undermine credibility. Air and water
quality monitoring, emissions accounting, and pollution compliance are uneven
and under-resourced, eroding the trust on which both domestic investment and
international credibility depend (MoEFCC, 2019).
Fourth, the relationship between global commitments and domestic agency
is unresolved. India has historically resisted external pressure while
asserting national ownership of its climate policy. The 2047 roadmap must
reconcile this sovereign stance with the urgent, cooperative demands of the
global commons, particularly in a world where supply chains, finance, and trade
are increasingly climate-conditioned (Climate Action Tracker, 2022).
8. Policy Recommendations
for the Roadmap to 2047
On the basis of the preceding analysis, this paper offers five
recommendations. First, align fiscal policy with Net Zero: reform subsidies and
taxation so that the price signals facing households, firms, and investors
consistently reinforce decarbonisation, while protecting low-income consumers
through targeted transfers. Second, institutionalise just-transition planning:
create a statutory framework requiring coal-linked and carbon-intensive regions
to prepare transition plans with dedicated financing, so that equity is built
into the design of the transition rather than bolted on in response to
displacement. Third, deepen state-level green capacity: invest in sub-national
institutions, aligning state power, renewable, and environmental mandates so
that the 2047 vision is implemented as a federal compact. Fourth, move from
reactive to anticipatory regulation: build the institutional ability to assess
emerging technologies—green hydrogen, batteries, carbon removal, digital
monitoring—so that regulation enables rather than lags innovation. Fifth,
expand the finance market: develop sovereign green bonds, blended finance, and
a climate-aligned financial regulatory framework that mobilises domestic
institutional capital at the scale required (CEEW, 2025; IPCC, 2022).
9. Conclusion
This paper has argued that green growth must be understood as a
constitutive pillar of Viksit Bharat, not an optional complement to it. India’s
development and climate agendas, far from being in tension, are convergent: the
resource base on which rapid, inclusive growth depends is inseparable from the
environmental and climate transition that India has committed to under the
Paris Agreement and its own national missions. The evidence largely supports
the proposition that a green economy can be an engine of value creation and
employment at the very scale the 2047 vision requires (CEEW, 2025).
Realising that promise will, however, demand a rethinking of the roadmap
along financial, institutional, and distributive lines. Fossil incumbency,
financing gaps, enforcement weaknesses, and uneven regional gains are not
incidental obstacles but structural ones. The task for the quarter-century
ahead is to build the policy architecture—fiscal alignment, just-transition
planning, state capacity, anticipatory regulation, and scaled finance—that
converts an aspirational vision into a managed, equitable, and credible
transition. Viksit Bharat at 2047 will be judged not merely by the size of its
economy but by whether that growth was built on a foundation that could endure.
Green growth is that foundation.
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